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| THE COURT OF CHIVALRY | |
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The Court in the 17th Century
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The High Court of Chivalry
in the early seventeenth century During the early years of Charles’s reign the court operated under a much looser and more ad hoc regime, much as it had done with the Lords Commissioners in James’s reign. Evidence for proceedings in this period is sparse, but what there is indicates that the hearings held by the Arundel tended to be small, informal affairs, conducted before himself or his deputy. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these is that they do indicate that the Earl Marshal was now attracting a good deal of business via James’s anti-duelling proclamations. In a 1625 complaint, Sir Samuel Argall referred to having been ‘digracefully affronted’ and given ‘the lye, which uncivill behaviour was…in breach and contempt of his Majesties’ proclamacon and ordinances.’ There was evidently a growing recognition that the Court of Chivalry was prepared to tackle ‘plea of words’ and willing to provide reparation for gentlemen who had been slandered or defamed. In cases where the offender was a plebeian, Arundel generally sentenced them to a spell in the Marshalsea; where other gentlemen were involved he usually tried to have the matter settled by local arbiters. Even while it was operating at this relatively low level of activity, however, the court did not escape controversy. Throughout Charles’s reign it was subjected to regular sniping and harassment by common lawyers eager to limit its jurisdiction and jealous of the exclusive rights to practice enjoyed by civil lawyers. As Brian Levack has demonstrated, this was part of an ongoing struggle dating back to James’s reign in which predatory common lawyers, like Sir Edward Coke, took every opportunity to undermine the civilians and assert the primacy of their branch of law. These tensions came to a head in late 1630-early 1631 over the case of Tompson v Jones, in which Mr Jones, a London churchwarden, had been imprisoned in the Marshalsea at the behest of Thomas Tompson, pursuivant to the heralds. Jones obtained a Habeas Corpus from King’s Bench to secure his release, but was then promptly rearrested by the Earl Marshal. The case caused considerable debate amongst the crown’s law officers, but eventually they sided with the Earl Marshal, and the claims of his court were upheld. This offered a considerable boost to the self-assurance of the civil lawyers, and the arguments used in this case to support their jurisdiction give a good indication of the basis on which they were able to make increasingly confident assertions about the rights of their branch of law. Referring to its direct remit from the king to try cases of honour, they insisted that it ‘was ever held as a jurisdiction beyond [King’s Bench] and of an higher nature and reformation as made by a higher power.’ Against the common law assumption of superiority, because it alone had existed since time immemorial, it was argued that ‘the law of the court marshall was as ancient and as much lex terrae as any other practised in the kingdom.’ And on the vexed issue of prohibitions - which were issued to remove proceedings from civil law courts such as Arches and Admiralty so that they could be tried at common law – it was claimed that ‘there can be no appeal from the Court Marshall to the King’s Bench, for statute hath settled it otherwise.’ For good measure the court’s supporters referred back to the privy council pronouncement and privy seal letter of July-August 1622 and pointed out that a challenge to its jurisdiction now would represent ‘the overthrow of the legall power of the counsell board in this point.’ The outcome of Tompson v Jones undoubtedly helped to bolster the confidence of the Court of Chivalry and its practitioners; but, as William Noy, one of the legal officers called in to advise on the case, warned, its position remained fraught with controversy : ‘many will take occasion to talke of the lawfulness of it in this tyme wherein men are ready to dispute of all things.’
Proceed to: Reay v Ramsey
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Steve Rea & Richard Cust |